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Challenging the AP: Clarifying the No Gun Ri Incident
Challenging the AP: Clarifying the No Gun Ri
Incident
On July 26, 1950, American soldiers from the 2nd
Battalion 7th Cavalry Regiment opened fire on Ko-
rean refugees near No Gun Ri in south-central South
Korea. No one disputes this claim. However, the how
and why of the events of that day have been hotly
disputed since the Associated Press (AP) published
a story on the incident in late September 1999. The
AP reported that the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion
had received direct orders to fire on the refugees and
that between 300 and 400 Koreans died in the mas-
sacre, including 100 in strafings by the air force. In
No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War
Incident, Robert Bateman enters the debate by claim-
ing that while American soldiers did indeed kill civil-
ians that summer day, they did so unintentionally
and were largely acting in the “fog of war.” He then
challenges the AP’s research and objectivity by as-
serting that it either carelessly or deliberately misled
its readers. Bateman’s book represents sound schol-
arship and shows the danger of the AP’s shallow and
incomplete research.
Bateman breaks his study into two distinct parts
to describe what he considers to be the two different
stories arising from the No Gun Ri incident and the
AP’s story. In the first, he addresses the military his-
tory of the incident by examining the American units
that were near No Gun Ri in late July 1950. He
details their lack of training, inadequate leadership,
and insufficient supplies. He then describes how the
events surrounding the incident on July 26 unfolded.
In the second part, he provides a primer on how his-
torical research should be conducted by critiquing the
methods utilized by the AP. He concludes that Amer-
ican soldiers did fire over the refugees’ heads to get
them to stop and returned fire after being shot at
by communist guerillas from within the refugee col-
umn. However, he stresses that the AP exaggerated
the newness of the story and the casualties suffered
by the refugees.
Bateman meticulously traces the situation that
led to the incident in the first five chapters. He ex-
plores the division of Korea and the civil war that
existed in South Korea in the late 1940s. He then
examines problems faced by the U.S. Army, and the
7th Cavalry Regiment in particular, as the United
States demobilized after World War II, yet raised its
commitments around the world. The American oc-
cupation force in Japan, including the 7th Cavalry,
was undermanned, undertrained, and undersupplied.
Its men rarely trained in numbers above the platoon
level and its best officers and men were transferred to
other units immediately before the regiment was de-
ployed to Korea. As a result, the soldiers that arrived
in Korea in July lacked both training and leadership.
To make matters worse, they were thrust into a bat-
tle that had already seen the destruction of several
American and most South Korean units.
Bateman describes the fear and confusion that
these young, poorly trained American soldiers expe-
rienced in the summer of 1950. On the night of July
25-26, the men of the 2nd Battalion believed they
were under attack. In reality, the supposed enemy
of that night was a lost American unit. Unfortu-
nately, most of the men in the 2nd Battalion broke
and ran, many of them abandoning their equipment.
The next morning the battalion began to reorganize
and recover its equipment. The men were still shaken,
and there were growing fears that the North Koreans
were trying to infiltrate the American lines by hiding
in the many refugee columns. The situation turned
tragic when the 2nd Battalion tried to stop a group
of refugees approaching its position.
According to Bateman, the tragedy occurred be-
cause of a convergence of events. Poorly trained and
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led soldiers were placed in a difficult situation; ru-
mors were rampant that communist forces were us-
ing refugees to hide their movements; and several
communists did fire upon the Americans from within
the refugee column. After between thirty and ninety
seconds of American return fire, up to thirty-five
refugees had been wounded or killed.
If not for the AP’s 1999 story, Bateman would not
have written this book. However, the story piqued his
interest because he had recently served as an officer in
the 7th Cavalry. He knew personally one of the chief
witnesses in the AP story, Edward Daily, and won-
dered how such an event could have occurred. As his
investigation unfolded, however, he increasingly came
to conclude that the AP’s story was inaccurate and
that much of its research was incomplete at best.
The first weak link in the story was the supposed
order to shoot. Although Bateman found some such
orders during the Korean War, the 7th Cavalry did
not receive any order to fire on refugees in July 1950.
Instead, it was merely told to stop the refugees from
crossing its lines. This order led to the unit’s firing
mortar shells in front of the column and shooting ri-
fles over their heads. Although these inadvertently
caused at least a few casualties, there was no di-
rect targeting of the civilians. Bateman also failed
to discover any evidence of air force strafing mis-
sions within several miles of No Gun Ri in late July.
There were missions in August along the railway line
near No Gun Ri, but not earlier. Finally, despite
the AP’s report of hundreds killed, Bateman could
find no graves in the vicinity of the incident. From
Bateman’s perspective, the AP story simply could
not have been true.
In the second part of the book, Bateman eval-
uated the stories of the AP’s three main witnesses,
Edward Daily, Delos Flint, and Eugene Hesselman.
His findings are shocking: “In reality, none of these
three men were actually at No Gun Ri during the
events of July 26-29, 1950” (p. 136). Bateman deter-
mined that each of these men either lied or had expe-
rienced a memory failure. Daily’s case is most trou-
bling because he claimed to have been an officer and
to have personally fired on the refugees. Bateman’s
investigation reveals that Daily never rose above the
rank of sergeant and only served in the 7th Cavalry
in 1951. Further, Bateman contends that both Delos
Flint and Eugene Hesselman were wounded the night
of July 25-26 and evacuated before the incident ever
occurred. The AP, Bateman concluded, had relied on
unreliable witnesses.
It is doubtful that anyone will ever describe the
No Gun Ri incident in more detail or with more accu-
racy than Bateman. He has carefully marshaled his
evidence and drawn conclusions based on his own mil-
itary experience and scholarly training. A tragedy did
occur on July 26, 1950. American soldiers panicked
under difficult conditions and killed innocent civil-
ians. Bateman, however, shows that their actions, al-
though unfortunate, were understandable considering
their lack of training, inadequate leadership, and the
presence of communist guerillas within the refugee
columns.
Only a few problems mar this impressive book.
Although unintentional, Bateman’s efforts to unravel
the AP’s story can cause the reader to forget that a
tragedy did occur in late July 1950 near No Gun Ri.
By Bateman’s own estimates, up to thirty-five South
Koreans died that day. Even if unintentional, those
losses should always be remembered. Also, Bateman
discounts the testimony of South Korean witnesses as
being skewed by time and/or motivated by the desire
for reparations. While these accusations are possi-
bly true, Bateman should not have discounted them
without making more efforts to determine their valid-
ity. Finally, Bateman includes a short, four-page sec-
tion on the career of S.L.A. Marshall that has at best
tangential importance to his story. His own account
of Edward Daily’s career provides sufficient evidence
that some veterans have falsified their records.
Despite these few minor problems, Bateman has
written a book that should be a valuable resource
for scholars, the media, and the general public. He
reveals the pitfalls of drawing conclusions from in-
complete investigations and shows how true historical
research should be conducted.
If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the list discussion logs at:
http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl.
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